A Survey of Auction Types

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Two categories of auctions

- · Single dimensional
 - The only bid dimensions are price and quantity of a single good
- · Multi-dimensional

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Single-dimensional auctions we'll cover

- 1. one sided
 - 1.1 English
 - 1.2 Dutch
 - 1.3 Japanese 1.4 Sealed bid
 - 1.5 Elimination
 - 1.6 Hybrid
- 2. two sided
 - 2.1 Continuous double auction (CDA)
 - 2.2 Call market (periodic clear)

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Single-unit English auction

- · Bidders call ascending prices
- · Auction ends at a fixed time / when no more bids
- · Final bidder pays his bid

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Multi-unit English auction are less straightforward

- Different pricing scheme
 - lowest accepted (uniform pricing, confusingly sometimes called "Dutch")
 - highest rejected (uniform pricing)
 - $pay-your-bid\ (discriminatory\ pricin\ g)$
- Different tie-breaking rules
 - price
 - quantity
- · Different restrictions on quantity change
 - des cending rule
 - the problem with this rule
 - 10 units available; reserve price (and price quote) is \$1
 A bids \$5/unit for 10 units (not AON); price quote is \$6

 - B bids \$6 for 2; price quote is still \$6
 A (re)bids \$6 for 1; A's commitment dropped to from \$40 to \$6; price quote is \$1

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Dutch ("descending clock") auction

- Auctioneer calls out descending prices
- First bidder to jump in gets the good at that price
- With multiple units: bidders shout out a quantity rather than "mine". The clock can continue to drop, or reset to any value.

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Japanese auction (name not universal)

- · Auctioneer calls out ascending prices
- Bidders are initially "in", and drop out (irrevocably) at certain prices
- · Last guy standing gets it at that price
- Multi-unit version: bidders call out quantities rather than simple "in" or "out", and the quantities decrease between rounds. Auction ends when supply meets or exceeds demand. (Note: what happens if exceeds?)

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Sealed bid auctions

- · Each bidder submits a sealed bid
- (Usually) highest bid wins
- · Price is
- first price
 - second price
- k'th price
- Note: Can still reveal interesting information during auction
- In multiple units: similar pricing options as in English

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Elimination (aka survival) auction

- · New auction type invented at Stanford
- · Motivation: the best of English/Japanese and sealed bid
- Process: Multiple sealed-bid rounds. In each round the lowest bidder drops out and their bid becomes the (revealed) reserve price for next round
- Can have more than one drop out at each round; the bid of the *lowest* drop-out is the new reserve price
- · Can generalize to multiple units

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Multi-phase auctions

- · English to sealed bid
- · Sealed bid to English
- etc

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Note reversal in reverse (buy-side) auctions

- · English descending
- · Dutch ascending
- · Japanese descending
- · Elimination descending

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• Call ("periodic clear") market

- NASDAQ-like

• Continuous double auction (CDA)

- orders are matched periodically

- Arizona stock exchange (AZX) -like

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Two-sided (double) auctions


- every new order is matched immediately if possible


- otherwise, or remainder, is put on the order book


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
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
Multi-dimensional auctions we'll cover (briefly) 1. Multi-attribute 2. Multi-good 2.1 Combinatorial 2.2 Composite auctions 2.2.1 global variables 2.2.2 synchronization 2.2.3 global clear 2.2.4 example: Simultaneous Ascending Auction (SAA)

































































Pricing Policy



- Uniform vs. Discriminatory
- First (worst winning) vs. Second (best losing)
- Buyers' vs. Sellers'
- Earliest vs. Latest
- Anywhere in between...

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